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THE CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
REGULATION FOR GOVERNMENTS ON THE 
POLITICAL LEFT: 
A COMPARISON OF BRAZILIAN AND UNITED 











At the December 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference 
in Copenhagen, as is now well known, the parties failed to agree on any 
detailed course of action, much less enter into a binding agreement to 
control carbon emissions.  However, four developing countries, Brazil, 
China, India and South Africa, formed a working group now known as 
―BASIC,‖ and promised to try and resolve at least one key sticking point. 
Specifically, the BASIC countries brokered an accord with the United 
States under which both developing and more developed nations would 
later submit carbon emissions target cuts.
1
   
On a more personal level, much was expected of U.S. President Ba-
                                               
 Professor and Co-Director, Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan 
Growth, Georgia State University College of Law (Atlanta, USA).  Professor Crawford‘s 
contribution to this essay could not have been possible without the excellent research as-
sistance of Kevin Morris, Georgia State University College of Law Class of 2010. 
 Environmental Law Professor at State University of Amazonas (Manaus, Brazil) 
and at Mackenzie University (São Paulo. Brazil). International Director of a Lawyers for 
a Green Planet Institute (Brazil).  
*** Georgia State University College of Law, Class of 2010 salutatorian. Clerk to 
Georgia Superior Court Judge Cindy Morris, 2010-2011. 
1 See, e.g., Jason Groves & David Derbyshire, Climate Change Summit Accepts 
―Toothless‖ US-Backed Agreement—But Deal is Not Legally Binding, MAILONLINE, 
Dec. 19, 2009, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/art-icle-
1236659/Copenhagen-climate-change-conference-World-leaders-reach-Copenhagen-
agreement--officials-admit-enough.html (last visited, Mar. 25, 2010).   
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rack Obama‘s presence at the conference, as many hoped that this sig-
naled that the country, which had long been the world‘s single greatest 
emitter of carbon dioxide,
2
 was finally going to ante up to its responsibil-
ity to cut emissions.
3
  In the end, however, Obama and the U.S. position 
disappointed most. Brazil‘s leading newspaper, for example, indicated 
that Obama‘s inability to provide strong leadership on the issue was a 
―failure and disappointment.‖4  By contrast, Brazilian President Luís In-
ácio Lula da Silva was perhaps the greatest star of the Copenhagen con-
ference, acknowledging the need to establish an agreement based upon 
the principle of ―common but differentiated responsibilities.‖5 President 
Lula outlined a bold position defending targets for cutting greenhouse 
gas emissions in Brazil from 36.1% to 38.9% by 2020, as well as assum-
ing that the country could finance part of the agreement.
6
  The differenc-
                                               
2 That dubious honor is now held by China. See JANE A. LEGGETT, JEFFREY LOGAN 
& ANNA MACKEY, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CHINA‘S GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
AND MITIGATION POLICIES 8 (2008). 
3 See, e.g., John M. Broder, Obama To Go To Copenhagen with Emissions Target, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/26/us/politics/26climate.html (last visited, March 25, 
2010); Obama To Attend Climate Change Summit, CNN.COM, Nov. 25, 2009, available 
at http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/11/25/obama.copenhagen.climate/index.html  
(last visited, March 25, 2010). 
4 Chico de Goes, Deborah Berlinck & Roberto Jansen, Fracasso e decepção: 
Líderes mundiais deixam Copenhague sem conseguir acordo forte para o clima (Failure 
and disappointment: World leaders leave Copenhagen without achieving strong climate 
agreement), O GLOBO (Brazil), Dec. 19, 2009, at 39. 
5 In a speech at the Copenhagen conference, the 15th session of the Conference of 
the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-15), on Decem-
ber 18th 2009, President Lula affirmed that  
"[d]eveloped countries must put their money on the table because of the green-
house gases they have emitted for two centuries, allowing them to industrialize be-
fore the developing world. The COP-15 should not be negotiations between the 
haves and have nots… rather these negotiations are about constructing sustainable 
opportunities for everyone around the world." 
Discurso Durante Sessão Plenária de Debate Informal na Conferência das Partes da 
Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre Mudança do Clima – COP-15 (Speech During 
Informal Plenary Debate at the Conference of Parties of the UN Convention on Climate 
Change – COP-15, AMBIENTE BRASIL, available at 
http://cop.ambientebrasil.com.br/2009/12/20/discurso-do-presidente-luiz-inacio-lula-da-
silva/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).  
6 Even if one acknowledges that Lula‘s position was progressive and bold in an in-
ternational forum, it should be observed that his government‘s decisions concerning envi-
ronmental matters continue to be cautious. For example, while speaking at COP15 for the 
climate change, the Brazilian House of Deputies passed Bill 12 of 2003 (December 16 th, 
2009) regulating the powers of each entity of government - federal, state and local - to 
license, monitor and punish offenses against the environment.  The Ministry of the Envi-
ronment and its partner agencies believe that such legislation, if enacted as is by the Bra-
zilian Senate, will encourage deforestation and the destruction of biomes such as the 
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es in the presentation and reception of these two leaders and their coun-
tries in climate change negotiations, both before and after Copenhagen, 
prompts us to ask: do appearance and rhetoric match reality? 
On the face of it, the leaders themselves share much in common.  
They are both politically progressive leaders with appealing life stories 
who were elected on platforms promising vast social and economic 
change, including new environmental commitments.  Thus, a comparison 
of their individual rhetoric and actions—and that of their respective gov-
ernments—on climate change may help illuminate some of the chal-
lenges facing the effort to take concerted global action on climate 
change. 
Under the United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention 
(―UNFCCC‖), ―climate change‖ is defined as ―a change of climate which 
is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the com-
position of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural cli-
mate variability observed over comparable time periods.‖7  As the 
UNFCCC definition alludes, the phenomenon of global climate change 
has exposed the basis of modern economic and social development—
human consumption of and dependence on fossil-based energy.  Reflec-
tion on the phenomenon of climate change thus forces us to think about 
the interdependent relations between human societies and their environ-
ment, and will shape the way we balance economic and social develop-
ment with environmental protection and natural resource management in 
the future. 
As noted above, in both Brazil and the United States, progressive 
governments have been elected in recent years, beginning with the 2000 
election of President ―Lula,‖ as he is known in Brazil , followed by the 
2008 election of President Obama in the United States.
8
   In terms of cli-
                                                                                                         
Amazon, since it removes the powers of the federal environmental agency (IBAMA) re-
sponsible for monitoring and punishing those responsible for projects whose environmen-
tal license was granted by state or municipal agencies.  Eliane Oliveira & Catarina Alen-
castro, A Lei da Selva (The Law of the Jungle), O GLOBO (Brazil), Dec. 18, 2009, 
available at http://www.jornaldaciencia.org.br/Detalhe.jsp?id=68010 (last visited, Mar. 
25, 2010).   
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 1, May 9, 1992, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at http://unf-
ccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (last visited, Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter 
UNFCCC]. 
8 In Brazil, after 22 years of seeking election, the Workers Party (―Partido dos Tra-
balhadores‖, or ―PT‖) finally witnessed the election of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva as Pres-
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mate change policy and action, any comparison between the two coun-
tries must, however, be undertaken with care and due respect for context.  
That is, one must consider differences in stages of development between 
the two countries, the different ecosystems which will be impacted by 
national climate change policies, as well as differences in the structure 
of, and inputs to, each nation‘s energy and transportation sectors.  Differ-
ences in these factors will not only affect the amount of national carbon 
emissions, but will also have a pronounced effect on the national policies 
designed to address the issue.  Nonetheless, it is a premise of this paper 
that because both nations are federal republics led by democratically 
elected progressive governments, a comparison of their policies may 
provide some insight regarding the challenges facing implementation of 
climate change policies even when a government is inclined—at least as 
judged by its rhetoric and political orientation—to act aggressively to 
curb carbon emissions and address the adaptation challenges presented 
by our changing climate. 
To begin, it is worth noting that both nations have signed and rati-
fied the UNFCCC and so have agreed to adopt national policies and take 
corresponding measures towards climate change mitigation
9
 by limiting 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhanc-
ing greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.
10
  In the language of sustainable 
development, the nations have ―common, but differentiated responsibili-
ties.‖11  The U.S. is classified as an Annex I Party including developed 
                                                                                                         
ident of the Brazilian Federative Republic in 2002 for a mandate of 4 years (2003-2006).  
President Lula was reelected in 2006 for a second mandate (2007-2010).  In the U.S., 
President Barack Obama was elected to a four-year term in November 2008, for the pe-
riod 2009-2012. 
9 Climate change mitigation 
"comprises all human activities aimed at reducing the emissions or enhancing the 
sinks of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide.  
Adaptation in the context of climate change refers to any adjustment that takes 
place in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected impacts of 
climate change, aimed at moderating harm or exploiting beneficial opportunities." 
Richard J.T. Klein, E. Lisa F. Schipper & Suraje Dessai, Integrating Mitigation and 
Adaptation into Climate and Development Policy: Three Research Questions, 8 ENVTL. 
SCI. & POL‘Y 579, 580 (2005).  In this text we will take into account the policies mitigat-
ing the effects of climate change. 
10 See UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4.  
11 UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 3(1);  cf. U.N. Conference on Environment & Devel-
opment, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development princ. 7, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.151/26/REV.1 (Vol. 1), Annex 1 (Aug. 12, 
1992) (adopting the notion of common, but differentiated responsibilities ―to conserve, 
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem‖).  For an analysis of 
this phrase in the context of on-going climate change negotiations as well as the obstacles 
facing its implementation, see generally Tuula Honkonen, The Principle of Common But 
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states and countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a 
market economy, and also as a developed state – Annex II Party – that 
must assume its historical responsibility for GHG emissions, and also.
 12
 
The Kyoto Protocol, a mechanism established to implement the goals of 
the UNFCCC,
13
 establishes quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments for industrialized countries, but the U.S. has not ratified it.  
Brazil, as a developing country, is classified as neither an Annex Part I 
nor II country under the UNFCCC, but is nevertheless obliged to coope-
rate in order to address climate change effects.  As a signatory to the 
Kyoto Protocol, Brazil must (as must all parties to that convention) pro-
vide national inventories of anthropogenic emission data and ―promote 
and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic, and 
other research‖; formulate and implement regional and national programs 
containing measures to mitigate climate change; ―cooperate in preparing 
for adaptation to the impacts of climate change‖ as well as promote and 
cooperate in order to develop technologies, practices, and processes that 
―control, reduce, or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gas-
es.‖14  Thus, although the country has no quantified obligations to reduce 
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, Brazil is obliged to cooperate with 
industrialized nations in achieving compliance with their quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments.  
In light of this background, the remainder of this paper will address 
the following questions: is there a difference between the ways that the 
progressive governments of Brazil and the U.S. are facing the climate 
change issue, or do they instead approach the climate change challenge 
similarly?  Specifically, do differences with respect to economic devel-
opment between the two nations necessitate variant approaches in grap-
pling with the effects of climate change and tailoring policies to combat 
those effects?  Or can similarities in climate change policies nevertheless 
be identified by virtue of the governance challenges these large, as well 
                                                                                                         
Differentiated Responsibility in Post-2012 Climate Negotiations, 18 REV. OF EUR. CMTY. 
& INT‘L ENVTL. L. 257 (2009). 
12 UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FACT SHEET: 
UNFCCC EMISSIONS REPORTING 2 (2009), available at http://unfccc.int/-
files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/fact_sheet_unfccc_emissions_reporting.pdf 
(last visited, Mar. 25, 2010).   
13 UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/it-
ems/2830.php (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
14 UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4(1)(a), (b), (c), (e), (g).  
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as geographically, ethnically, and economically diverse, nations face? 
These are the questions that this paper will consider by comparing Bra-
zilian and U.S. climate change plans and actions.  Part I briefly examines 
the causes and nature of the climate change problem, as well as the rela-
tion of both ecological and progressive political thinking to that problem. 
Part II then examines the climate change policies—and priorities—of the 
U.S. and Brazilian Governments.  Finally, Part III concludes that the ap-
proaches of each Administration exhibit a similar narrative—the expres-
sion of lofty goals, the implementation of which is fundamentally pla-
gued by a lack of urgency and the subservience of environmental issues 
such as climate change to other, often economic, considerations. 
I.  CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROGRESSIVE POLITICS 
Recent studies have confirmed that atmospheric emissions of green-
house gases (―GHGs‖)15 have risen considerably due to human activi-
ties.
16
  Emissions are attributable principally to two sources.  On the one 
hand, emissions of carbon dioxide (―CO2‖) result from the burning of 
fossil fuels (carbon, petroleum and natural gas) in thermoelectric plants 
and other heavy industry (especially metallurgic, steelwork, and trans-
portation industries), as well as emissions from domestic heating sys-
tems, deliberate setting of forest fires to clear land for other uses (such as 
farming) as well as deforestation for timber harvesting.  GHG emissions 
also result from anthropogenic emissions of methane (CH4) via decom-
position of organic material related to landfills, animal farming, and rice 
cultivation.
17
  Climate change results from the accumulation of these 
GHGs in the Earth‘s atmosphere, which the UNFCCC definition quoted 
                                               
15 Greenhouse gases are so-named because they absorb and re-emit infrared radia-
tion emitted from the Earth‘s surface, thus warming the planet.  GHGs include water va-
por (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), ozone (O3), chlo-
rofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and perfluorocarbons (PFCs).  U.S. 
Energy Info. Admn, Energy and the Environment Explained: Greenhouse Gases, availa-
ble at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/-energyexplained/index.cfm?page=environment_about_ghg 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2010).  
16 See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, WORKING GROUP 
I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 135-52 (Susan Solo-
mon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc-wg1.unibe.ch/publications/wg1-
ar4/wg1-ar4.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).  According to the IPCC report, ―it is ex-
tremely likely that humans have exerted a substantial warming influence on climate.‖  Id. 
at 131.  
17 See, e.g., Harvey Augenbraun, Elaine Matthews & David Sarma, The Global Me-
thane Cycle, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, available at 
http://icp.giss.nasa.gov/education/methane/intro/cycle.html (last visited February 20, 
2010) (concluding that human activities are responsible for approximately seventy per-
cent of global methane emissions).  
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above asserts, is largely the result of human activity, including fossil fuel 
burning, deforestation, livestock farming and other human-directed activ-
ities. 
A. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
Both Brazil and the United States are parties to the UNFCCC and 
are therefore obliged under that agreement to take measures to mitigate 
climate change. After the election of Presidents Lula and Obama, based 
on their rhetoric and campaign promises,
18
 climate change policies and 
actions should have been developed and adopted by both governments 
respecting the international community‘s desire to mitigate effects of 
climate change. Yet it merits remembering that the responsibilities of the 
two states differ under the UNFCCC. As already indicated, the UNFCCC 
adopts the principle of ―common but differentiated responsibilities,‖19 
which means that national mitigation efforts may take into account each 
State‘s respective capabilities and different social and economic condi-
tions. This principle has two elements: (1) it entitles all concerned states 
to participate in international response measures to combat climate 
change effects,  and (2) it requires different commitments from the signa-
tories, taking into account each state‘s historical contribution to the ef-
fects of climate change, mitigation capabilities, social and economical 
circumstances, and future development needs.
20
  
Under the applicable treaties, Brazil and the United States are re-
quired to do the following: 
 develop national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by source 
and removal by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
                                               
18See generally COLIGAÇÃO LULA PRESIDENTE, PROGRAMA DE GOVERNO 2002 
(2002), available at http://www.fpabramo.org.br/uploads/programagoverno.pdf (last vi-
sited October 27, 2010) (outlining President Lula‘s environmental program design) [he-
reinafter COLIGAÇÃO]; Barack Obama & Joe Biden, New Energy for America (2008), 
available at http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/newenergy_more (last visited Mar. 
25, 2010) (outlining President Obama‘s climate change strategy). 
19 UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 3(1).  For a history of this principle with respect to 
climate change dating back to the 1992 ―Earth Summit‖ in Rio De Janeiro, see generally 
Paul G. Harris, Common But Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocal and Unit-
ed States Policy, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 27 (1999). 
20 This principle ―seeks to respond to concerns over the legitimacy, equity and effec-
tiveness of international environmental regimes.‖ Honkonen, supra note 11, at 259. 
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Montreal Protocol,
21
 using comparable methodologies to be agreed 
upon by the climate change Conference of the Parties;  
 create ―[a] general description of steps taken or envisaged by the 
Party to implement the Convention;‖ and include in their commu-
nication ―[a]ny other information … relevant to the achievement of 
the objective of the Convention;‖22 
In 2004, Brazil submitted its National Communication, which in-
cluded a national GHG emissions inventory using 1994 GHG emissions 
data
23
 and a catalog of steps the country was taking toward reducing 
emissions.  In contrast to other developed countries, where CO2 emis-
sions come primarily from the consumption of fossil fuels, in Brazil the 
main causes of CO2 emissions in 1994 were land-use changes and the fo-
restry sector, which together accounted for 75% of emissions.  Mean-
while, the energy sector in Brazil accounted for only 23% of the nation‘s 
CO2 emissions.
24
  These differences remind us that climate change is not 
simply a scientifically discernable phenomenon, but must be also unders-
tood as reflecting social, economic, political, and cultural processes.  
B.  The Link between Climate Change Commitments and Political 
Ideology 
 Those committed to ―green‖ ideas often ―describe themselves as 
‗neither left nor right but in front‘ because they want to affirm their dif-
ference from other ideologies.‖25  However, ecological thinking—or 
                                               
21 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer annex A, Sept. 16, 
1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.  The Montreal Protocol is an interna-
tional treaty that was designed to combat deterioration of the Earth‘s ozone layer, strictly 
limiting the production and consumption of ozone-depleting chemicals.  For a history of 
the Montreal Protocol and its remarkable success, see generally Elias Mossos, The Mon-
treal Protocol and the Difficulty with International Change, 10 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 
J. 1 (2005). 
22 UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 12(1)(b), (c).  
23 In July 2010, Brazil‘s Minister of Environment Carlos Minc announced that the 
country will conduct a second inventory using 2004 GHG emissions data. Cf. 
INVENTARIO BRASILEIRO DAS EMISSOES E REMOCOES ANTROPOCAS DE GASES DE EFEITO 
ESTUFA – INFORMAÇÕES GERAIS E VALORES PRELIMINARES (BRAZILIAN INVENTORY OF 
EMISSIONS AND REMOVALS ANTHROPOGENIC GREENHOUSE GASES EMISSIONS – GENENRAL 
PRELIMINARY INFORMATION AND VALUES), Nov. 30, 2009, 
http://www.mct.gov.br/upd_blob/0207/207624.pdf  (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). 
24 ACACIO CONSONI ET AL., BRAZILIAN MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 
BRAZIL‘S INITIAL NATIONAL COMMUNICATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 87 (2004), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/brazilnc1e.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
25  NEIL CARTER, THE POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: IDEAS, ACTIVISM, POLICY 76 
(2d ed. 2007).  
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―ecologism‖—arguably has more in common with progressive ideologies 
that are  
(1) critical of capitalism and [that] have sought to transform it and (2) be-
lieve that human nature can and should be changed to make us less indivi-
dualistic and less materialistic, although [ecologism] has also drawn on re-
formist doctrines that seek to dilute the worst aspects of the market, such as 
welfare liberalism and social democracy.26  
 
Clearly, there is thus some overlap between ecologist and progressive 
political ideology, particularly with respect to the second portion of the 
ecologist creed stated above. 
This point invites us to examine to what extent the progressive gov-
ernments in Brazil and the U.S. are willing and or able to advocate ecol-
ogist thinking in their climate change policies.  That is, in their climate 
change policies, have the Lula and Obama Governments sought to inte-
grate environmental considerations in relevant social and economic polit-
ical policies, programs, and actions?   It must be acknowledged, of 
course, that Lula and his Government have been in power since 2003, 
while the Obama Administration only came into office in January 2009.  
Nonetheless, it is still possible to compare each administration‘s climate 
change mitigation platforms, policies, and actions. 
II. BRAZIL AND THE US: CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES (AND PROMISES) 
We begin by looking at the promises and priorities of the two can-
didates‘ political campaigns, drawing particular attention to their policies 
on environmental and energy sectors. 
                                               
26 Id. at 79.  Carter continues:  
[t]hus ecologism stretches leftwards from just right of centre, but it does not reach 
the far left because greens want to control the market rather than remove it and 
their suspicion of the state means they reject any form of command economy. Eco-
logism goes no further to the right because sustainability is incompatible with an 
unfettered market economy. Moreover, greater participatory democracy and decen-
tralisation would be impossible in either a command economy, by definition, or in 
a free market, where they would be curtailed by economic inequality and the capi-
talist dynamics of accumulation, competition and concentration. This approach 
leads to a conclusion that is slightly broader than that of Dobson: yes, ecologism 
does occupy broadly left-of-center territory, but it draws in a wider range of pers-
pectives of anarchist-emancipatory framework. 
Id. 
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A. Lula’s Promises and Policies 
While campaigning for President, Lula released his 73-page ―2002 
Government Program,‖27 which affirmed that the only way to achieve 
economic development and reduce social inequalities was to adopt a 
model of alternative development based on social reform and the demo-
cratization of state and social relations.
28
  The Program therefore pro-
posed a ―soft‖ transition to a new way of sustainable growth with fiscal 
responsibility and social compromise.  The Program asserted that the 
government would work for a new pattern of development with econom-
ic growth, social inclusion and environmental justice to guarantee to all a 
just and equitable distribution of natural resources and their benefits, tak-
ing into account the rights of future generations.
29
 Intergenerational equi-
ty is a concept premised on two fundamental observations: on the one 
hand, the recognition that human life is ―inseparable from environmental 
conditions‖ and, on the other hand, ―that human beings have the capacity 
to alter the environment.‖30  Lula‘s ambitious campaign program further 
expressed a commitment to the improvement of environmental quality 
based on three strategies: a) adoption of socio-environmental standards 
for public policies; b) implementation of targets for socio-environmental 
indicators of progress (including deforestation, hot spots, emission of 
CO2 and CFC, sewage and sanitary treatment, water supply, control of 
pollution vectors, waste management, air quality, natural resources 
access, energy consumption, clean technologies); and c) social control by 
                                               
27 COLIGAÇÃO, supra note 18. 
28  Id.at 3. 
29 Id. at 14. The ―rights of future generations‖ refers to the principle of ―inter-
generational equity,‖ a principle derived from the Preamble to the United Nation‘s 1948 
―Universal Declaration of Human Rights,‖ which declared that a ―recognition of the inhe-
rent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.‖ Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights  pmbl., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).  
Expression of this same principle can be traced throughout the second half of the twen-
tieth century.  For example, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 
proclaimed the principle of ―a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environ-
ment for present and future generations.‖ United Nations Conference on the Human En-
vironment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Declaration on the Human Environment, 
princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972).  Edith Weiss, surveying several 
modern international declarations and covenants on human rights, noted that ―[t]hese in-
struments reveal a fundamental belief in the dignity of all members of human society and 
in an equality of rights that extends in time as well as space.‖  Edith B. Weiss, Agora: 
What Obligation  Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Envi-
ronmental Responsibility, 84 AM. J. INT‘L L. 190, 201 (1990) (emphasis added).  
30 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 643 (Daniel 
Bodansky et al., eds., 2007). 
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societal participation, environmental education and information. The 
document further asserted that the government would establish integrated 
energy planning, including hydroelectric, oil and natural gas, carbon, 
nuclear, alternative (e.g. aeolic, solar and biomass) sources, as well as 
concentrate on energy efficiency, co-generation and distribution of gen-
eration sources.  In addition, the Program posited sustainable develop-
ment as the objective of national energy policies, and sought to ensure 
sustainability by taking into account, and sought to optimize, the use of 
locally available energy sources.
31
 In connection with the goal of sustai-
nability, the Program also committed Brazil to continue to provide incen-
tives for the production and use of ethanol—an area in which Brazil has 
long distinguished itself




Four years later, during President Lula‘s re-election effort, the cam-
paign issued a much-abbreviated campaign platform, ―President Lula: 
Government Program 2007–2010,‖ grandly announced that during the 
first period of Lula‘s Government, Brazil had entered into a phase of sus-
tainable development.
34
  This Program describes the nation‘s achieve-
ments as well as its potential in 38 topical areas, three of which are im-
portant for the current analysis.  First, the document celebrates industrial 
                                               
31 In Brazil, wind energy is one of the renewable forms of electric power that has 
been receiving the largest portion of investments from the Incentive Program for Alter-
nate Electric Power Sources (PROINFA), coordinated by the Mines and Energy Ministry, 
but, ―Solar power utilization brings long term benefits to the nation making possible the 
development of remote regions where the cost of electric power by the conventional me-
thods would be too high for an attractive financial return on the investment. In addition, 
solar energy would contribute to regulate the energy during drought periods and thereby 
diminishing the dependency on the crude oil market with a consequent decrease in pollut-
ing gas emissions into the atmosphere as established by the Kyoto Conference‖. ENIO 
BUENO PEREIRA E ALI, ATLAS BRASILEIRO DE ENERGIA SOLAR (BRAZILIAN ATLAS OF 
SOLAR ENERGY), avaiable at http://www.fc-solar.com/conceitos/atlas_solar-reduced.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2010). 
32 See, e.g., Joe A. Flores, Future International Trade Issues: Is Brazil the Solution 
to World Energy Shortages through Ethanol Trade?, 16 INT‘L TRADE L.J. 62 (2008) (trac-
ing the history of Brazil‘s ethanol industry and initiatives, dating back to the 1970‘s); 
Monte Reel, Brazil’s Road to Energy Independence, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2006, availa-
ble at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/19/AR2006081900842.html (last visited March 25, 2010)  
33 COLIGAÇÃO, supra note 18. 
34 Lula Presidente, Programa de Governo 2007/2010 (2006), available at 
http://www.pt.org.br/portalpt/images/arquivos/plano_governo.pdf. Note that the 2006 
report is less than half the length of the 2002 report (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).  
30 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 2:2 2010] 
policies that aimed to simplify environmental legislation.  Second, the 
program asserts Brazil‘s promise as an energy power,35 highlighting the 
Lula Government‘s plan to built two hydroelectric dams on the Ama-
zon—at Rio Madeira and Belo Monte36—as well as the consolidation of 
biofuel production
37—including ethanol,38 biodiesel,39 and H-Bio—thus 
encouraging the exportation of biofuel technology to Latin America and 
Africa.
40
  The plan also stresses the importance of developing energy ef-
ficiency programs and fomenting the adoption of more efficient automo-
bile, engine, and household appliance technologies.  Third and finally, 
the Program touts the environmental successes of the first Lula Adminis-
tration, which the Program maintains earned distinction through creating 
and consolidating protected areas, reducing the annual deforestation rate 
in the Amazon and other biomes, creating incentives for clean technolo-
gies, and promoting sustainable energy use. 
At first glance, the environmental emphasis and successes of the 
Lula Administration are obvious; however, a deeper look reveals that the 
                                               
35 Jeb Blount, Brazil Expects Power Demand to Rise 7.4% and Is Ramping Up Hy-
dro and Thermal Projects, GLOBAL POWER REPORT, Jan. 21, 2010, available at 2010 
WLNR 2341941. 
36 See Georgia O. Carvalho, Environmental Resistance and the Politics of Energy 
Development in the Brazilian Amazon, 15 J. ENV‘T & DEV. 245 (2006); Philip M. Fearn-
side, As Hidrelétricas de Belo Monte e Altamira (Babaquara) Como Fontes de Gases de 
Efeito Estufa, 12 Novos Cadernos NAEA 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.periodicos.ufpa.br/index.php/ncn/article/view/315/-501 (last visited Mar. 25, 
2010). 
37 See J.S. Clancy, Are Biofuels Pro-Poor? Assessing the Evidence. 20 EUR. J. DEV. 
RES. 416 (2008). 
38 Luiz A. Martinelli & Solange Filoso, Expansion of Sugarcane Ethanol Production 
in Brazil: Environmental and Social Challenges, 18 ECOL. APPS. 885 (2008), available at 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/brazil.mart-inelli.filoso.sugarcane.production.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
39 Solange Teles da Silva & Carolina Dutra, Brazilian Policy on Biodiesels: A Sound 
Means of Mitigating Climate Change?, in CLIMATE LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 311–33 (Benjamin J. Rich-
ardson et al. eds., 2009). 
40  Brazil has signed memorandums of understanding to advance cooperation on 
ethanol fuel production and use with other nations in Latin America and Africa. See Pau-
lo Sotero, Brazil as an Emerging Donor: Huge Potential and Growing Pains, WORLD 
BANK INST.: DEV. OUTREACH (Feb. 2009), available at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/textonlyid526.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
For example, these memorandums have been signed with Belize, Costa Rica, Egypt and 
Panamá (September 13, 2005), and with Guiana (September 12, 2005). The continued 
emergence of the global ethanol and biofuel markets has created further participatory op-
portunities for Brazil, which are discussed in Gilmar Masiero & Heloisa Lopes, Etanol e 
Biodiesel Como Recursos Energéticos Alternativos:Perspectivas da América Latina e da 
Ásia, 51 REV. BRAS. POLÍT. INT. 60 (2008), available at 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbpi/v51n2/v51n2a05.pdf (last visited Mar. 25. 2010). 
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above asserted claims contain inherent contradictions.  For example, 
some of the areas most needing protection in Brazil are located in the 
Amazon Basin, where the Government has aggressively pushed forward 
plans to build hydroelectric plants
41
 and invested billions in ―Frigorific 
Meat Companies‖, contributing to the advance of cattle ranching, in the 
opposite side of the policy to combat deforestation.
42
Thus, it merits ask-
ing whether in fact the Government delivered on all of its promises with 
respect to environmental concerns.
43
 
Indeed, the Lula Government has actually done much better on eco-
nomic and social policies than in environmental matters. For example, 
the government‘s record serving the poorest part of Brazilian population 
through its ―Bolsa-Família‖ Program44 is a clear success story in social 
terms,
45
 as is the increase in the minimum wage.
46
 By contrast, the envi-
                                               
41 See, e.g., Carvalho, supra note 3836; Tom Phillips, Brazil to Build Controversial 
Bel Monte Hydroelectric Dam in Amazon Rainforest, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Feb. 3, 2010, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environ-ment/2010/feb/02/brazil-amazon-
rainforest-hydroelectric-dam (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) (highlighting dam opposition by 
environmentalists and indigenous activists concerned about impacts on river ecology and 
local populations).  
42 See, Marta Salomon, BNDES ajudou a patrocinar desmatamento da 
Amazônia, diz TCU (BNDES helped sponsor deforestation of the Amazon, says 
TCU), O Estado de São Paulo, Oct. 23, 2010, avaiable at 
http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/vidae,bndes-ajudou-a-patrocinar-
desmatamento-da-amazonia-diz-tcu,628829,0.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). 
43 Under the ―Ten Years Expansion Plan for Energy 2008-2017‖, federal 
government had plans to build 81 new units of thermal power plants by 2017, 
with 68 of them are based on fossil fuels that produce greenhouse gases. The 
New Ten Years Expansion Plan for Energy-2019 attempted to correct deviations 
of the previous plan and do not envisage any expansion of electricity with coal, 
gas and fuel oil beyond 2013. But it seems that it‘s a plan of hydroelectricity: by 
2019 it is planned to build about 30 million megawatt hydroelectric (including 
Belo Monte). Supra note 43. 
44 Law No. 10.836, of 09 of January 2004. The program is designed to break ―the 
cycle of intergenerational transmission‖ of poverty through the direct transfer of income 
to poor families in exchange for parental commitments to keep children in school and 
take them for health checks-ups. Bolsa Família: Changing the Lives of Millions in Brazil, 
THE WORLD BANK, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/BRAZILEXT
N/0,,contentMDK:21447054~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:322341,00.html 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
45  See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 44 (―[T]he Bolsa Família Program may be the 
[program] that is having the greatest impact on the lives of millions of low-income Bra-
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ronmental pillar of sustainable development has often been neglected by 
the Lula government, which has been widely criticized for failing to con-
sider environmental values and regarding environmental legislation as an 
obstacle for economic development.
47
  In this sense, the greatest chal-
lenge of this left-of-center government is to take affirmative steps to im-
plement the discourse of sustainable development.  In particular, action 
must be taken on energetic matrix choices in light of global climate 
change and its effects in order to combat deforestation and preserve Bra-
zilian ecosystems. It remains to be seen whether Lula‘s discourse and po-




It is further important to observe that in 2007, as part of the Brazili-
an National Plan on Climate Change,
49
 President Lula instituted the In-
ter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change (―CIM‖ in its Portuguese 
acronym), a body guiding the formulation of the national plan on all is-
sues related to climate change in Brazil.
50
  Some non-profit groups, how-
                                                                                                         
zilians.‖). 
46 See The Most Popular Politician on Earth, NEWSWEEK.COM, Sept. 22, 2009, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/215941 (last visited February 21, 2010) (not-
ing that President Lula has increased the Brazilian minimum wage by sixty seven percent 
since 2003). 
47 ―The problem is that, in the core of the government, there‘s no agreement of envi-
ronmental question as part of the strategic solution for the development of the Country. 
Environment is treated like a problem that must be solved, like an obstacle‖. (―O 
problema é que não existe, no núcleo do governo, um entendimento de que a questão 
ambiental é parte de uma solução estratégica para o desenvolvimento do País. O meio 
ambiente é tratado como um problema a ser resolvido, como um empecilho‖.)  See 
Herton Escobar, João Paulo Capobianco: Ex-Secretário-Executivo do Ministério do Meio 
Ambiente (MMA), MOVIMENTO NOSSA SAO PAULO (Feb. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.nossasaopaulo.org.br/portal/node/2305 (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
48 AMBIENTE BRASIL, supra note 5. 
49  Pres. Decree no. 6263, of 21 of November 2007.  The Plan was officially adopted 
by the government in December 2008. Add Cite. 
50 CIM is coordinated by the Office of the President of the Republic, and is com-
posed of seventeen federal bodies and the Brazilian Climate Change Forum (FBMC) 
(Presidential Decree nº 6.263/2007). The FMBC is itself headed by the President of the 
Republic and composed of several stakeholder members including Ministers of State, 
Presidents of Regulatory Agencies, State Secretaries for the Environment, representatives 
from the Business Sector, Civil Society, Universities and Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions (Presidential Decree nº 3.515/2000). The federal bodies that belong to CIM are: the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Supply, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Minis-
try of Defense, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Na-
tional Integration, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Cities, the Ministry of External 
Relations, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Ministry of Agrarian Development, the 
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, the Ministry of the Environment, 
the Ministry of Planning, the Budget and Planning, the Ministry of Transport, and the 
Strategic Issues Secretary of the Presidency of the Republic. 
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ever, have expressed disappointment at the delay in public consultation 
about the Plan, and also for the setting of targets to reduce GHG emis-
sions, which must be measurable, reportable and verifiable.
51
  In fact, the 
Plan established four strategic pillars: (i) reduction of GHG emissions, 
(ii) adaptation to the effects of climate change, (iii) research and devel-
opment, and (iv) dissemination and training. Some voluntary targets have 
been adopted, such as the 
―reduction of 40% in the average deforestation rate by 2006-2009 periods 
in relation to the average rate of the ten years‘ reference period used in the 
Amazon Fund (1996-2005). For each of the next two periods of four years, 
reach 30% of extra reduction, in relation to the previous period.‖52   
The Plan recognizes that in order to achieve sustainable development, 
further efforts must be made to reduce energy consumption through 
energy efficiency and conservation measures.
53
  The target of reduction 
of GEEs of 36.1% and 38.9% by 2020, announced by the Brazilian dele-
gation at COP-15, has become binding with Federal Law No. 12.187 of 
December 29, 2009, that adopts the National Policy on Climate Change 
(Política Nacional sobre Mudança do Clima – PNMC). Nevertheless, un-
der this law, these targets are based on a voluntary approach and a feder-
al decree must be adopted detailing all actions for achieving them. This 
law also affirms that all governmental programs and policies must take 
into account the principles, aims and mechanisms of the National Policy 
of Climate Change. Based on the precautionary principle and a commit-
ment to sustainable development, this policy has among its aims the re-
duction of GHG anthropomorphic emissions and also the preservation, 
conservation, and recuperation of natural resources, particularly those 
that are considered national heritage sites.
54
  Furthermore, the National 
                                               
51 See Sociedade Civil Quer Que o Governo Defina Metas de Redução de Emissões 
de Gases de Efeito Estufa [Civil Society Wants the Government to Set Targets for Cutting 
Emissions of Greenhouse Gases], SOCIOAMBIENTAL (Oct. 29, 2008, 11:30 AM), availa-
ble at http://www.socioamb-iental.org/nsa/detalhe?id=2790 (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
52 Interministerial Committee on Climate Change, Executive Summary: National 
Plan on Climate Change, GOV‘T OF BRAZ., 14 (Dec. 2008), available at 
http://www.mma.gov.br/estruturas/208/_arquivos/national_plan_208.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2010). 
53 For instance, the Plan seeks ―a reduction in electricity consumption of around 
10% in 2030 . . . which can avoid emissions of 30 million tons of CO2 the same year, in a 
conservative estimate.‖ Id. at 8. 
54 Under Brazil‘s Federal Constitution, ―[t]he Brazilian Amazonian Forest, the At-
lantic Forest, the Serra do Mar, the Pantanal Mato-Grossense, and the coastal zone are 
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Fund of Climate Change
55
 was also adopted, which establishes a me-
chanism for implementing this policy, and provides resources to support 
projects or studies and financing of projects aimed at mitigating climate 
change and adaptation to climate change and its effects.
56
  However, it is 
necessary to highlight that the Government has vetoed three articles of 
National Policy on Climate Change Law:  two of them concerning the 
replacement of fossil fuels. The first one established as one of the poli-
cy‘s aims ―to stimulate the development and use of clean technologies 
and the gradual abandonment of the use of energy sources that use fossil 
fuels.‖57  The second one asserted how it would be provided a gradual 
replacement of fossil fuels.
58
 
Even if these laws have already been adopted, more than rhetoric is 
needed to integrate environmental concerns with other policies, particu-
larly energy policies, which impact, for example, hydroelectric plant 
construction in the Amazon Region, biofuels and nuclear energy, and 
agriculture and cattle development.  To put it bluntly, agribusiness in 
particular continues to view environmental protection as an obstacle to 
national economic development.   The shared threat of climate change 
may be the opportunity to begin to achieve such policy integration.  To 
date, however, the Lula Administration has not realized that goal.  
                                                                                                         
part of the national patrimony.‖  Constituicao Federal [C.F.] art. 225, par. 4 (Braz.).   
55 Law no. 12.114, of December 9, 2009. 
56 Under this federal law, the use of funds may be allocated to the following activi-
ties: I - education, training, and mobilization in the area of climate change; II - Science of 
Climate Impact Analysis and Vulnerability; III - the adaptation of society and ecosystems 
to the impacts of climate change; IV - projects to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases - 
emissions; V - projects to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degrada-
tion, with priority to natural areas threatened with destruction and strategies relevant to 
biodiversity conservation; VI - development and dissemination of technology to mitigate 
emissions of greenhouse gases; VII - the formulation of public policies for solving prob-
lems related to emission and mitigation of GHG emissions; VIII - research and creation 
of systems and design methodologies and inventories that contribute to reducing net 
emissions of greenhouse gases and reducing emissions from deforestation and changing 
land use; IX - the development of products and services that contribute to the dynamics 
of environmental conservation and stabilization of the concentration of greenhouse gases; 
X - support for sustainable production chains; XI - payments for environmental services 
to communities and individuals whose activities have contributed to carbon storage, 
linked to other environmental services; XII - agroforestry systems that contribute to re-
duction of deforestation and carbon uptake by sinks and income generation; XIII - resto-
ration of degraded areas and forest restoration, prioritizing areas of Legal Reserve and 
Permanent Preservation Areas and priority areas for the generation and quality assurance 
of environmental services. Id. 
57 Law no. 12.187, art.4, III, of December 29, 2009. 
58 Id. art. 10.  
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 B. Obama’s Promises and Priorities 
Shortly after his election in November 2008, then President-elect 
Obama boldly announced that when it came to climate change regula-
tion, ―delay [was] no longer an option.‖59  As was the case with Lula, 
President Obama‘s designs for clean energy and climate change policy 
reform were comprehensively laid out on the campaign trail.  While 
campaigning, Obama introduced his ―New Energy for America‖ plan—
an ambitious, integrated proposal that addressed ―climate change, energy 
generation, energy efficiency, oil and gas, alternative fuels and vehicles, 
as well as clean air and clean water.‖60  Taking note of the global ―ha-
voc‖ resulting from climate change, the plan expressed a commitment to 
regulating GHG emissions through an economy-wide cap-and-trade sys-
tem designed to drastically reduce carbon emissions by 2050.
61
  In addi-
tion, the plan emphasized the need for America to transition to a clean 
energy economy.  Beginning with the premise that America‘s energy 
needs would be ―best served through a sustained effort to diversify our 
energy sources,‖62  the plan called for at least 10% of all electricity used 
in the U.S. to be ―derived from clean, sustainable energy sources, like so-
lar, wind and geothermal by 2012.
63
  Specifically in the area of alterna-
tive fuels, Obama‘s plan supported the development and integration of 
biofuels, including advanced biofuels such as cellulosic ethanol and bio-
butanol.
64
   
As made evident by the ―New Energy for America‖ plan espoused 
on the campaign trail, the new Administration‘s approach to the issue of 
climate change consists of two broad initiatives: innovation and regula-
tion.  The development of advanced energy technology has already re-
ceived an enormous boost from federal stimulus funding.  The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (―ARRA‖) signed into law by the Presi-
dent on February 17, 2009, and designed to help the faltering U.S. econ-
                                               
59 John M. Broder, Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 22057302. 
60 Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for America, OBAMA FOR AMERICA 
(Aug. 3, 2008), available at http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/fact-
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omy, allocated $36.7 billion to the Department of Energy.
65
  Among oth-
er things, the funds will be used to develop alternative fuel and energy 
efficiency technology such as fuel-cells, advanced building systems, 
commercial scale biorefinary projects, and industrial carbon capture ap-
plications.
66
  As promising as this resource commitment may seem, how-
ever, it represents but a small fraction of the $787 billion ARRA stimulus 
package,
67
 to say nothing of the bank and financial institution bailout that 
occurred several months before passage of the ARRA.
68
 
In addition to funding technological development through ARRA, 
the Obama Administration has also taken initiative to ensure that such 
technology is deployed around the world in an effort to combat global 
climate change.  For instance, in August 2009 President Obama, along 
with Mexican President Felipe Calderón and Canadian Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper, reaffirmed his commitment to clean energy with the 
North American Leaders‘ Declaration on Climate Change and Clean 
Energy.
69
  The Declaration sets out a general framework for action as the 
region works towards ―environmental cooperation, sustainable develop-
ment, and clean energy research, development, and deployment.‖70  
Then, in November, the President announced a bilateral agreement with 
China to tackle the issue of climate change through joint clean energy in-
itiatives, the purpose being to secure ―wide-spread renewable energy 
deployment in both countries.‖71 
In terms of climate change regulation, central to the Obama Admin-
istration‘s approach is a commitment to a market-based, cap-and-trade 
                                               
65 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115. 
66 U.S. Dept. of Energy, Recovery and Reinvestment: DOE Recovery Act Funding, 
available at http://energy.gov/recovery/pillars.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (providing 
a breakdown of ARRA DOE fund allocations). 
67 Recovery.gov, available at 
http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/RecipientReportedData/Pages/StateTotalsByAge
ncy.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (detailing total funds allocated under ARRA as well 
as funds actually distributed). 
68 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
343, 122 Stat. 3765, was signed into law by President Bush on October 3, 2008.  EESA 
created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which authorized the Department of 
Treasury to purchase up to approximately $700 billion of troubled assets from financial 
institutions.  
69 Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, North American 
Leaders‘ Declaration on Climate Change and Clean Energy (Aug.10, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_off-ice/North-American-Leaders-Declaration-on-
Climate-Change-and-Clean-Energy/ (last visited Mar.29, 2010). 
70 Id. 
71 U.S. Dept. of Energy, U.S.-China Energy Announcements (Nov. 17, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.energy.gov/news2009/8292.htm (last visited Feb.27, 2010). 
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system,
72
 a commitment first announced on the campaign trail and to 
which the President remained steadfast at the international Copenhagen 
conference in December 2009.
73
  A host of alternative energy and cli-
mate change-related measures have been introduced in Congress, the 
most prominent among them the two cap and trade bills.
74
  The cap and 
trade programs at the heart of both the American Clean Energy and Secu-
rity Act (―ACESA‖), introduced in the House, and the Clean Energy Jobs 
and American Power Act (―CEJAPA‖), introduced in the Senate, are 
very similar in form.
75
  Each bill would impose GHG emissions caps that 
strengthen over time and allow regulated entities to trade emissions al-
lowances.  The Senate bill, however, sets a slightly stronger cap on 2020 
emissions
76
 and reserves more EPA authority to regulate GHGs under the 
CAA.
77
  ACESA passed the House in June 2009, though not without sig-
                                               
72 The White House, Issues: Energy & Environment, available at http://www.white-
house.gov/issues/energy-and-environment (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). 
73 See Juliet Eilperin, In Wake of Copenhagen, Obama’s Next Challenge is Cap and 
Trade, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 26, 2009, at 14A, available at 2009 WLNR 25982616 
(―Obama and his deputies have regarded international climate talks as a way to get the 
sort of commitments from major emerging economies that would allow them to sell a 
cap-and-trade bill to skeptical lawmakers back home.‖)  
74 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA), H.R. 2454, 
111th Cong. (2009), was introduced in the House by Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA30) on 
May 15, 2009. Committee on Energy and Commerce, Chairmen Waxman and Markey 
Introduce ―The American Clean Energy and Security Act‖, available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_con-
tent&view=article&id=1622 (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).  On Sept. 30, 2009, Sen. John 
Kerry (D-MA) introduced in the Senate the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act 
(CEJAPA), S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009). Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Envi-
ronment & Public Works, Kerry, Boxer Introduce Clean Energy Jobs and American 
Power Act (Sept. 30, 2009), available at 
http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Majority.PressReleases (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2010). Other related bills include the American Clean Energy Leadership Act, 
S. 1462, 111th Cong. (2009), and the Solar Technology Roadmap Act, H.R. 3585, 111th 
Cong. (2009).  
75 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC 
PROGRAMS, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF S. 1733: THE CLEAN ENERGY JOBS AND AMERICAN 
POWER ACT OF 2009 (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/climate-
change/economics/pdfs/EPA_S1733_Analysis.pdf (last visited Feb 20, 2010) (comparing 
the House and Senate bills). 
76 CEJAPA, S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009) sets the 2020 GHG emissions cap at 
eighty percent of 2005 emissions while ACESA, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 311 (2009) 
sets the 2020 GHG emissions cap at eighty-three percent of 2005 emissions.  
77 ACESA, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 331 (2009).  (ACESA expressly removes the 
EPA‘s authority to set performance standards for climate change related GHG emissions 
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nificant political opposition.
78
  CEJAPA, by contrast, was favorably re-
ported by committee, but a vote in the Senate is not expected at least un-
til the spring.
79
  After Copenhagen, the domestic political climate in the 
United States cooled somewhat towards climate change—once again.  As 
of this writing, it is difficult to predict whether climate change will draw 
the attention it deserves from the U.S. Congress and Executive branch.
80
  
But the introduction of a pared down energy bill in the Senate in July 
2010, absent a cap and trade component, may have signaled the death 
knell for comprehensive carbon legislation in the near future.
81
  Political 
opposition at this point is simply too staunch, and Senator majority lead-
er Harry Reid appears to have pinned his hopes on wooing Republicans 
with more modest energy legislation.
82
  Moreover, a recent declaration 
by one of the Republican supporters of the Senate bill that ―cap-and-
trade is dead‖83 certainly does not bode well for an economy-wide sys-
tem. 
Though cap and trade was and, at least at this point, remains the 
centerpiece of the Obama Administration‘s regulatory approach to cli-
mate change, other regulatory measures have also been advanced.  For 
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78 See, e.g., Peter Roff, Numbers Adding Up Against Obama’s ―Cap and Trade‖ Bill 
in Senate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 7, 2009, available at 
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obamas-cap-and-trade-bill-in-the-senate.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
79 Ben German, Kerry Says Copenhagen Key to Paving the Way for U.S. Law on 
Emissions Cuts, THE HILL, Dec. 16, 2009, available at 
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/72627-kerry-says-copenhagen-key-to-us-law-on-
emission-cuts (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
80 See John M. Broder, Advocates of Climate Bill Scale Down Their Goals, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at A4, available at http://www.ny-
times.com/2010/01/27/science/earth/27climate.html (last visited Feb 21, 2010) (discuss-
ing the uncertain fate of cap and trade measures). 
81 Clean Energy Jobs and Oil Company Accountability Act of 2010, S. 3663, 111th 
Cong. (2010).  In response to the bill, President Obama stated that it is ―an important step 
in the right direction‖ but that he intends to ―keep pushing for broader reform, including 
climate legislation.‖   Mark Clayton, Stripped Down Energy Bill Leaves Out ―Cap and 
Trade,‖ CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 27, 2010, available at http://www.csmon-
itor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0727/Stripped-down-energy-bill-leaves-out-cap-and-trade 
(last visited September 26, 2010). 
82 See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 82; Timothy Gardner, Reid Hopeful for GOP Ener-
gy Votes after Elections, REUTERS.COM, Aug. 31, 2010, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67U52F20100831?feedType=RSS&feedName=
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instance, the President signed an executive order in October 2009 ―to es-
tablish an integrated strategy towards sustainability in the Federal Gov-
ernment and to make reduction of greenhouse gas emissions a priority 
for Federal agencies.‖84  The executive order requires federal agencies to 
develop sustainability plans, set GHG reduction targets, and reduce fleet 
petroleum use.
85
  This may seem a small measure, but the federal gov-
ernment is the largest energy consumer in the U.S.
86
  Moreover, much 
more significant GHG regulation could be on the horizon.  The EPA 
does not currently regulate GHG emissions with respect to climate 
change, but that could change significantly under the Obama Administra-
tion.  In December 2009, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(―EPA‖) issued its final finding that GHGs endanger public health and 
welfare.
87
  This finding marks a radical departure from previous EPA 
policy under the Bush and earlier Administrations, setting the stage for 
future EPA regulation of GHGs under the Clean Air Act.
88
  Though the 
President has expressed a preference for a legislative response to the is-
sue of GHG emissions,
89
 the endangerment finding does enable the EPA 
to regulate emissions should Congress fail to pass a cap and trade bill. 
With respect to the still-young Obama Administration, in short, it 
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86 U.S. Dept. of Energy, Executive Order 13514 Signed on Federal Leadership in 
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88 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006).  In 2007, the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), that ―[i]f EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the Clean 
Air Act requires the agency to regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new 
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ever, the Court rejected the EPA‘s claim and held that the ―sweeping‖ language of the 
Clean Air Act not only authorized carbon dioxide regulation, but required such regulation 
in the event of a public endangerment finding.  Id. at 533.  The EPA‘s December finding 
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89 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Finds Greenhouse Gases Pose 
Threat to Public Health, Welfare, http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/adm-
press.nsf/0/0EF7DF675805295D8525759B00566924 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (noting 
that both President Obama and EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson prefer a comprehensive 
legislative response to GHG emissions). 
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must be said that it has expressed laudable enthusiasm for climate change 
regulation and initiatives.  However, at this point, rhetoric has outpaced 
political results.  Though it is far too early to pass judgment on the Ob-
ama Administration‘s climate change legacy, a sober assessment of the 
current situation reveals that the Administration has not yet executed the 
level of change many expected after his election.  The prospects of cap 
and trade legislation, a centerpiece of Obama‘s climate change policy, 
are uncertain and may be dwindling.  Moreover, many were disappointed 
with the tepid results of the December 2009 Copenhagen Convention,
90
 
which concluded with nothing more than a non-binding international po-
litical agreement.
91
  Already staunch domestic political opposition to Ob-
ama‘s progressive climate change agenda appears to have been galva-
nized by the Administration‘s plodding.92  Despite the Administration‘s 
conspicuous first year political struggles regarding climate change poli-
cy, it is important to bear in mind that billions of economic stimulus dol-
lars have already been poured into alternative energy and energy conser-
vation initiatives designed to spur technological development.  These 
efforts will in many cases require years of germination, but could in the 
end yield the type of transformative results that political action has failed 
to achieve. 
III.  FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
As is now widely recognized, contemporary capitalism, built as it is 
on the generalized free-exchange of goods and services, is an ―energi-
vore‖ and thus constitutes the principal cause of anthropogenic carbon 
emissions.
93
  In light of that reality, this brief article has attempted to as-
sist in understanding whether there is a difference between the ways that 
the progressive administrations now governing in Brazil and the U.S. ap-
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proach this issue, or whether they instead approach the climate change 
challenge similarly.  Specifically, we have sought to begin to understand 
whether the government of a developed country like the United States 
has acted differently in comparison to a nation in development like Bra-
zil as to climate change effects and policies adopted to combat them only 
because of differences in development, or whether similarities in climate 
change policies can be identified by virtue of the governance challenges 
these large, as well as geographically, ethnically and economically di-
verse, nations face.   
It is our conclusion that despite differences between the two nations, 
their records with respect to climate change mitigation activities are not 
vastly different.  Rhetoric notwithstanding, climate change goals and pol-
icy have been trumped by non-environmental interests.  For example, 
when the global financial crisis began in 2008, both administrations un-
dertook to support the automobile industries.  In Brazil, Federal Value-
Added Tax on Industrialized Goods on automobile were reduced to in-
centivize the purchase of cars and trucks.  The indirect result, however, 
would be an increase of future CO2 auto-emissions.  Further evidence 
that the environmental aspirations contained in President Lula‘s cam-
paign literature have sometimes been relegated to secondary status 
comes from the fact that various governmental initiatives to halt the 
progress of deforestation, a primary cause of CO2 emissions in Brazil, 
have been pushed aside in favor of rural agribusiness under pressure 
from the National Congress.
94
 Recently, the Brazilian National Congress, 
influenced by the agribusiness and agroenergy sectors, seeks to change 
the legislation – defined in the Forest Code – legally sanctioning defore-
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95 Brazil's forest code of 1965 requires all Brazilians to preserve native for-
est on private lands and establishes two types of protected areas: a) permanently 
protected areas (―areas de preservação permanente‖) (habitat along rivers, slopes 
and hilltops) in rural and urban areas; b) legal forest reserve (―reserve legal‖) in 
rural areas: landowners must preserve 20 percent of their property along the At-
lantic Forest; 35 percent in savannahs and 80 percent in areas of forests in the 
Legal Amazon. Of course,  
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In the U.S., the threat of economic catastrophe spurred quick and 
decisive action with the passage of the $700 million bank bailout and 
nearly $800 million stimulus bill.  The threat of environmental catastro-
phe that may result from global climate change, however, has engen-
dered a far more restrained response.  As noted above, only a relatively 
small percentage of the stimulus funds were allocated to the development 
of alternative energy to address emissions mitigation.  In addition, the 
Administration does not appear to have made climate change regulation a 
major priority during its the first eighteen months.  The President under-
took an important step, at least symbolically, by attending the U.N. con-
ference in Copenhagen in December 2009.  At home, however, the pros-
pects of economy wide cap and trade are growing bleak, and the EPA has 
recently announced that it will delay GHG regulation of power plant 
emissions under the Clean Air Act until at least January 2011.
96
 
Another important issue of central importance to each nation‘s cli-
mate change policy is the current focus on biofuels.  The push for biofu-
els has dominated discussion of alternative energy in both countries, 
even while the possible GHG effects of these ―alternatives‖ remains un-
clear.  Moreover, it must be remembered that despite the emphasis re-
cently placed on biofuels, the economies in both countries continue to 
run on a solid base of fossil fuels. To illustrate, when large reserves of 
petroleum were recently identified off the coast of Rio de Janeiro, the 
                                                                                                         
―these requirements were never enough to overcome the brute force of fron-
tier economics‖. ―Aldo Rebelo, a Communist Party deputy from the state of 
Sao Paulo, has headed the reform effort. The commission's report would put 
more power in the hands of state governments, allowing them to unilaterally 
decrease the amount of habitat landowners must preserve to 50 percent in 
the Amazon and 20 percent in the savannahs. Although Rebelo dropped 
language that would have scaled back permanent protections along rivers, 
the commission approved language that would provide amnesty to any and 
all landowners who illegally cleared their land prior to 22 July 2008‖. 
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Brazilian Government sounded more like its North American counterpart 
than a sustainability visionary when it vetoed portions of the law that 
created the National Climate Change Policy suggesting that national fuel 
needs preempted the strict observance of the climate change policy.  In 
addition, in the U.S., in March 2010, President Obama announced a plan 
to open millions of acres of coastline along the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, 
and Alaska to offshore drilling.
97
  The enormous scale of the announced 
proposal signals a reversal of Obama‘s 2008 campaign position, which 
originally rejected offshore drilling
98
 but eventually expressed an open-
ness to only limited offshore drilling.
99
 
In short, neither country‘s behavior demonstrates the kind of deep, 
sustained commitment to alternative energy, sustainable practices, and 
new consumer behaviors that must be exhibited if the threat of climate 
change is to be adequately combated.  The progressive administrations in 
Brazil and the U.S. purport to recognize the scale and immediacy of the 
climate change threat, and both nations have undertaken measures de-
signed to combat that threat.  The sense of urgency needed to respond ef-
fectively to the issue of climate change and other environmental issues, 
however, has regularly been overcome by other considerations, often 
economic in nature.   As result, the actual remedial steps taken by both 
administrations have in many instances deviated from the paths blazed 
by their rhetoric. 
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